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Abstract| Socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with both health (physical and mental) and cognitive
ability. Understanding and ameliorating the problems of low SES have long been goals of economics and
sociology; in recent years, these have also become goals of neuroscience. However, opinion varies
widely on the relevance of neuroscience to SES-related policy. The present article addresses the
question of whether and how neuroscience can contribute to the development of social policy
concerning poverty, and the social and ethical risks inherent in trying. I argue that the neuroscience
approach to SES-related policy has been both prematurely celebrated and peremptorily dismissed, and
that some of its possible social impacts have been viewed with excessive alarm. Neuroscience has
already made modest contributions to SES-related policy and its potential to have a more effective and
beneficial influence can be expected to grow over the coming years.

[H1] Introduction

Poverty exists throughout the world and its prevalence in even affluent societies may be surprising to
those unfamiliar with the statistics. In the US, for example, measured relative to the federal poverty line
(an income corresponding to $25,100 to support a family of four1), 12.7% of the public live below the
poverty line and 29.8% live on less than twice that amount2. These percentages are higher for children,
with 18.0% and 39.1% living in poor and low-income families, respectively. Different countries use
different definitions of poverty and direct comparisons are further complicated by many other social
and economic differences between countries; however, recent surveys show that poverty by any
reasonable definition is common across the globe3,4,5. Poverty reduction ranks among the top goals of
many governmental and multilateral organizations, for compelling reasons: in addition to the obvious
deprivations related to food, shelter and other basic needs, social science research shows that poverty is
associated with shorter and less healthy lives, higher rates of mental illness and lower cognitive ability
(Fig. 1a-c).
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It is not only the poor who are afflicted by these physical and mental ills. Although risk for these
outcomes is most concentrated among this group, it is present to a lesser degree for the near-poor and
declines gradually as income rises6. Indeed, the recognition of these graded effects was a pivotal
development in health disparities research, and in 1994 Adler and colleagues called on the field to
confront “the challenge of the gradient”6. With the emphasis on understanding the gradient came a
broadened conception of the factors that distinguish the poor from the affluent. In addition to income
and other economic factors, social factors such as educational attainment and occupational status were
found to cluster together with income and wealth, forming a construct known as socioeconomic status
(SES).

There is obvious mutual relevance between research on poverty and research on SES and the distinction
between these concepts is not always prominently marked in discussions of such research. Furthermore,
much of the literature considered in this article lumps together economic and noneconomic measures of
SES and the range of deprivation varies across studies. In this Perspective, I will therefore adopt a
‘lumping’ rather than ‘splitting’ approach to SES and poverty but note that more precisely characterizing
these distinctions would be very worthwhile, especially with respect to policy7,8.

Only recently have neuroscientists sought to understand SES. As shown in Fig. 1d, the neuroscience of
SES emerged in the 21st century and has grown rapidly in recent years. The existing literature is primarily
focused on elucidating the neural correlates of SES, their causes and their consequences for people’s
lives. Many of the consequences of SES noted earlier and illustrated in Fig. 1 have links to the brain.
Mental health and cognitive ability are obviously related to neural processes. Less obvious, but
empirically well-established, is the role of the brain in vulnerability to physical illnesses such as heart
disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis and cancer, through its role in transducing and regulating stress and
the endocrine and immune responses that ensue9,10.
Large organizations with poverty reduction agendas, such as the World Bank11 and UNICEF12 have taken
note of the neuroscience of SES. The most recent installments in a series on child development in lowand middle-income countries published by The Lancet make extensive reference to neuroscience and
brain development13,14,15. In the UK and US, neuroscience has been brought to bear on child policy: in
the UK, in two influential reports to the British government16,17 and, in the US, in the writings of
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researchers affiliated with Harvard’s Center on the Developing Child18 (see Box 1). Neuroscience has
even been embraced as a source of actionable poverty policy guidance concerning effective teaching19
and economic betterment20. The hope that neuroscience will be of immediate, practical use against
social problems is widely expressed in the popular press: for example, in 2016 Newsweek published an
article on poverty21 that proclaimed “neuroscience has now linked the environment, behavior and brain
activity—and that could lead to a stunning overhaul of both educational and social policies.” However,
not all commentators have been so enthusiastic. The potential to use neuroscience in poverty policy has
been criticized by some as unrealistic (e.g.22,23,24) and by others as laden with value judgements (e.g. 25,26)
or as a dangerous diversion of attention away from social and economic injustice (e.g. 27).

The goal of this Perspective is to assess the promise of neuroscience as a source of guidance on poverty
policy. Before considering how and whether the neuroscience of SES holds practical promise, a short
overview of the science will be provided. I will then consider whether it can help us understand how SES
comes to be associated with so many important life outcomes and whether it can now, or in the
foreseeable future, provide specific, actionable policy guidance. Finally, I will ask whether framing
socioeconomic disparities in terms of brain science increases our willingness to help the poor or imposes
particular social values on them.

[H1] The neuroscience of SES

Less than a decade ago it was possible to provide a complete accounting of the literature on SES and the
brain in 7 pages28. With the field’s rapid growth, the state of the science is now challenging to present
concisely; however, several recent reviews have aimed to do so (e.g. 29,30,31).

Socioeconomic disparities in cognitive and emotional functions, from infancy through to old age, are
being investigated using the tools of neuroscience. The literature includes studies using
electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERP) and structural and functional MRI29,30,31.
These studies have aimed to characterize differences across levels of SES and to relate these differences
to their potential causes as well as to differences in behavior, ability and wellbeing. Animal research has
also been brought to bear on questions of causation, by testing hypotheses about the effects of factors
that are correlated with SES in humans and the pathways through which SES differences become
associated with brain differences9,32.
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It has become increasingly clear that different life adversities affect brain development and function
through at least partly different mechanisms. The effects of institutionalization are probably not the
same as those of neglect33. Similarly, socioeconomic disadvantage (which itself is multifactorial and
somewhat variable from context to context) is distinct from other risk factors, such as abuse and
neglect34. Many adversities tend to co-occur but do not necessarily affect the brain in the same ways.
Sheridan and McLaughlin34 have distinguished between the impacts of deprivation and threat, which
presumably operate in different proportions in poverty and maltreatment, on different neural
correlates35. Thus, findings on the effects of ‘adverse childhood experiences’36 or ‘cumulative stress’37,
which are the subjects of larger and more established literatures, should not be assumed to generalize
to poverty or low SES.

Rather than attempting to summarize our accumulating knowledge about SES and the brain, I will here
offer selected examples of the kinds of questions that have been asked, along with studies aimed at
answering them (see 29 for a recent review). These examples were selected to illustrate the wide range
of methods and samples used and to have relevance to different aspects of cognition and emotion.

[H2]The neural correlates of socioeconomic status. One kind of question is a simple, descriptive one:
does SES have measurable neural correlates and, if so, what features of the brain are correlated with
SES? This question has been asked in studies of brain structure and brain function in children and adults,
most often focusing on regional differences but increasingly also on networks. For example, by analyzing
the structural MRIs of children and youth, a study by Noble and colleagues identified regionally-specific
differences in cortical surface area as a function of both family income and parental education, with
covariates including genetic ancestry38. When controlling for education and other covariates, significant
effects of income on surface area remained in bilateral inferior frontal, cingulate, insula and inferior
temporal regions and in the right superior frontal cortex and precuneus. Furthermore, the relationship
between surface area and SES was shown to be strongest at the lowest SES levels; SES had a positive
relationship with surface area at all levels of income and education, but the difference between poverty
and near-poverty mattered most.

Questions about qualitative differences in neural structure and processing have also begun to be
addressed. On the one hand, SES might simply increase or decrease some aspect of the brain in tandem
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with increasing and decreasing measures of ability or health. On the other, it might moderate the
relationship between brain and behavior such that individuals with higher and lower SES use their brains
in different ways to perform the same tasks. As an example of findings supporting the latter possibility, a
study that examined the neural correlates of children’s arithmetic processing found that SES moderated
the relationship between behavior and brain activation: in children from higher SES homes, the activity
of regions associated with verbal performance (including the left middle temporal gyrus) tracked
mathematical ability, whereas in children from lower SES homes ability was more closely related to
regions associated with spatial processing (including the right intraparietal sulcus)39.

Another type of question addressed by neuroscientists studying SES concerns the psychological
significance of SES-brain relationships: that is, whether the neural correlates are epiphenomenal or
whether they account for at least some of the socioeconomic disparities in cognitive or emotional
psychological measures. In many cases the relationship of SES to brain structure or activity either partly
or fully accounts for the relationship of SES to psychological measures of interest. For example, one
study performed structural imaging in a large sample of healthy young adults and assessed a set of
personality traits linked to depression40. This revealed that the relationship between family SES and
depression-related traits was partially accounted for by the volume of the medial prefrontal and the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Other studies have produced similar findings; for example, the study of
SES differences in cortical surface area, mentioned above, also found that these differences could
account for socioeconomic differences in cognitive outcomes38.

[H2] Mechanisms linking socioeconomic status to brain function. Ultimately, the most important
questions about SES and the brain concern mechanisms, and these are questions we are only beginning
to ask, let alone answer. How does SES become associated with brain structure and function? Decades
of debate in the social sciences regarding the psychological correlates of SES have shown that even the
direction of causality cannot be taken for granted (Box 2).

Mechanistic questions about SES are difficult to answer in part because SES is a distal factor. Income,
education and other dimensions of SES are indices of risk but do not themselves directly impinge on the
child or adult brain41. Rather, they are related to other, more proximal, factors, which have causal roles.
These proximal factors include nutrition, toxin exposure, prenatal health, cognitive stimulation
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(including linguistic interaction), stress, parenting behavior (particularly attentiveness and warmth) and
the possible genetic differences associated with SES30,42,43,44.

A growing number of studies in SES neuroscience have measured one or more candidate mediating
factors and tested whether they can account, statistically, for some or all of the relationship between
SES and brain structure or activity. For example, it was shown that mother-reported life stress and
quality of parenting behavior (based on videotaped interactions between parent and child) together
fully mediated the relationship between SES and hippocampal volume in children45. This is consistent
with differences in stress and parenting practices being the proximal causes of this particular neural
correlate of SES. Other human neuroscience studies have tested hypotheses concerning the causal
factors linking SES and brain structure and function, and animal studies of specific proximal causes such
as stress and other SES-correlated environmental factors can also be brought to bear (Box 3).

Of course, identifying proximal physical and psychosocial factors gives us only a partial mechanistic
understanding of SES and the brain. These factors are transduced by cellular and molecular processes, of
which we have some general knowledge but not a well worked-out understanding in relation to SES. An
exemplary step toward filling in such mechanisms was taken in a longitudinal study of stress-related
methylation of the serotonin transporter gene in adolescents46. Across two time-points, teenagers with
lower SES showed a greater increase in methylation than their higher SES peers and this was associated
with greater amygdala reactivity and more depression symptoms.

As the field learns more, questions about mechanisms are becoming more nuanced. For example, by
what mechanisms of brain development does SES correlate with brain structure and function during
different phases of childhood and adulthood and by what additional mechanisms of brain aging does SES
manifest itself in the brains of older adults? Studying the relationship between SES and cortical thickness
in children, an earlier and steeper decline among low SES participants was found47. The authors of this
study suggested that this may be due to interactions between SES-linked differences in cognitive and
linguistic stimulation and processes of synaptic pruning and myelination, which are responsive to
experience and contribute to the thinning of the cortex. Additionally, they point to evidence that early
life stress can accelerate brain development, potentially resulting in precocious thinning and, ultimately,
the closing of sensitive periods for environmental influence48. In older individuals, who normally show
cortical thinning, declines in white matter integrity and hippocampal volume loss, these effects are
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magnified by low SES49,50,51. Given the multifactorial nature of SES and the manifold nature of brain
development and function, it seems likely that the neural correlates of SES emerge through many
different mechanisms, operating at different ages and being responsible for different aspects of brain
structure and function.

[H1] Understanding SES disparities

Can neuroscience contribute in any substantive way to our understanding of poverty and its
accompanying disadvantages? Opinion is divided. Early efforts to integrate neuroscience with larger
social issues surrounding childhood poverty evoked great enthusiasm at the time, but were also
criticized for failing to connect the neuroscience to the social issues (Box 4)

One advantage of the neuroscience approach to understanding socioeconomic disparities is evident
even at this early stage: neural measures can reveal differences between higher and lower SES
individuals that are not apparent in more traditional, behavioral measures. This is true even though the
disparities we seek to understand are psychological and therefore more typically measured by behaviors
such as task performance or survey responses. For example, in several studies ERPs have revealed SES
disparities in the degree to which children filter out irrelevant sounds when paying attention in a
dichotic listening task51,52,53. None of these studies found a significant SES-related difference in
performance, even when performance was below ceiling, indicating that ERPs show greater sensitivity in
these studies to disparities in attention compared to the concurrently collected behavior. The value of
such measures is that a behavioral effect that is too small to be observed in a single laboratory testing
session might nevertheless matter. It could have cumulative effects over time or larger effects in real
world contexts. In other words, a larger sample of behavior or a sample from different tasks might
detect disparities with as much or more sensitivity than the ERP methods used in these studies. No inprinciple superiority of neural measures over behavioral measures is being claimed here, merely the
empirical observation that for some purposes, neural activity predicts outcomes better than traditionally
used measures of behavior55.

Another important advantage of neural measures in the study of SES disparities is their ability to reveal
qualitative differences in brain as a function of SES, not just more or less brain activity, volume or
cortical thickness, but different patterns of the brain measure in question. Behaviorally measured SES
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disparities generally take the form of a positive correlation between SES and task performance, which is
a simple quantitative relationship. The neural disparities follow the same trend in some cases, but in
others the neural differences appear to be qualitative. In the study of children’s arithmetic ability
mentioned above, for example, SES moderated the brain-behavior relationship, indicating that higher
and lower SES children used different neurocognitive systems in performing the task, independent of
level of performance39. As with the greater sensitivity of neural measures, the ability to reveal
qualitative differences is not an intrinsic superiority of neural over behavioral approaches. In the
example above, one can imagine behavioral research designs, such as a selective interference paradigm
with verbal and visuospatial interfering tasks, that could lead to the same conclusion. Nevertheless, the
insight about qualitative differences in arithmetical processing arose directly from the multivariate
nature of brain imaging, which can characterize processes in terms of different brain regions as well as
degrees of activation.

The final, and most distinctive, advantage of using the concepts and methods of neuroscience to
understand SES is that some of its relationships to psychological or behavioral outcomes may be, at root,
neurobiological. This point can be made most clearly by beginning with an example of a psychological
phenomenon related to SES that can be understood without recourse to neuroscience. The SES gradient
in performance on standardized school achievement tests is such an example, in that we can at least
aspire to explain it in terms of school quality, available role models for academic achievement and many
other factors whose relations to SES and test scores can be couched in the language of ‘belief-desire’
psychology56. Although there are also proposed neural mediators of the SES school achievement
relationship57,58, at present we do not know whether they add insight or predictive power beyond the
psychological explanations.

By contrast, some psychological phenomena may result from aspects of brain development and function
that can be explained only in terms of biological facts. If described in brain-free terms, such phenomena
will seem inexplicable, whereas when neural implementation is considered they will make sense in
terms of a wider fabric of explanation. One category of examples concerns obviously biological factors
with neural impact that are likely to have roles in explaining SES disparities in behavior and psychology.
On the environmental side, these include prenatal and postnatal nutritional deficiencies and SES-linked
exposures to environmental toxins59. They also include the synergisms of such factors with one another
and with ostensibly nonphysical socioeconomic factors such as parental education60. Finally, those
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expecting a role for genes in explaining SES disparities need not dig very deep to find fundamentally
neurobiological mechanisms61.

Even when SES disparities can be described in purely psychological terms, the mechanisms underlying
them may be irreducibly neural. For example, the psychological stresses of low SES have long been
known to be related to the higher incidence of depression symptoms in individuals at low levels of SES62.
This is particularly true of stress experienced early in life, which raises the risk of depression throughout
the lifespan63. Why is this? Reasoning on the basis of psychology alone, it is not apparent why the stress
of low SES early in life would render someone more susceptible to feelings of depression later (as
opposed to less susceptible or equally susceptible). Current research favors an explanation involving
stress mediated disruptions to the development of prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, amygdala and
reward system structures that are needed for the regulation of mood and stress response throughout
life64. The pathways through which early-life stress (not SES per se) affects the development and
function of these areas are now understood with greater cellular and molecular detail based on studies
in animals and humans9,65. Such studies have also highlighted the moderating role of parental care in
buffering the developing brain from the effects of stress66 and such care has also been found to impact
the effects of SES on hippocampal volume in humans45,67. The study methylation of the serotonin
transporter gene in adolescents mentioned above is another example of the explanatory advantage that
comes from neurobiological accounts of psychological phenomena46.

Thus, although neuroscience research on the mechanisms of SES disparities is nascent, early findings
demonstrate the ‘explanatory value added’ by neuroscience even for SES disparities in purely
psychological traits.

[H1] From knowledge to intervention

Beyond its benefits to the scientific understanding of SES and the association of SES with myriad life
outcomes, does the neuroscience of SES have real-world policy implications? Is it ready to guide policy,
in the sense of counting in favor or against specific programs or practices? Here I use the term ‘policy’ to
include not only governmental programs, but also official practice recommendations by professional
groups (such as health professionals, educators, law enforcement, legal and human resource
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professionals) and unofficial but nevertheless institutionalized practices involved in professional
education and norms of professional practice.

[H2] Current contributions of neuroscience to policy. One could argue that neuroscience can already
guide policy, insofar as it provides additional converging evidence in favor of approaches already
indicated by behavioral research. Examples include programs aimed at reducing child and parent stress
and at increasing parenting skills68. This is certainly not the “stunning overhaul” heralded by Newsweek,
but it is nevertheless a contribution. In policy-making, it is not only new and unprecedented ideas that
matter; additional support for a familiar idea can tip the balance in decision-making and therefore be
consequential.

This approach may seem odd to those whose understanding of science is based on critical experiments
designed to pit hypotheses against one another to see which one survives the attempt to falsify it. If we
already know something with a high degree of certainty, what is the value of showing it in a new way? In
answer, one can point first to the many ways in which null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) can
mislead69. Second, there are broader issues of validity, including construct validity and external validity,
which are particular challenges in the study of complex social and biological systems and which limit the
generality of conclusions that can be drawn from any single method. There are generally irreducible
gaps in the applicability of knowledge from any one study or method to the real world. As different
methodologies tend to have different strengths and weaknesses, converging evidence across methods
has value.

The approach typically used for policy decision-making focuses on the ‘weight of evidence’ (WOE). In
comparison to NHST, WOE is a less formalized approach to answering empirical questions related to
policy and typically involves an intuitive synthesis of diverse evidence, including qualitative and
quantitative data, the results of observational and experimental studies with humans or animals and
even the results of in vitro studies70. As an example, we can consider a hypothetical new policy
concerning pediatricians’ interactions with parents that suggests that pediatricians routinely ask parents
about their stress levels and the methods they use to manage stress, and direct parents to therapy and
support when stress is high or inadequately managed. It seems obvious that parental stress is not good
for children and psychology research has already provided behavioral evidence that stressed parents
have more troubled children71. However, given the costs of adding new procedures and responsibilities
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to pediatric practice, a singular source of evidence for the benefits might not suffice to support such an
intervention. The addition of new types of evidence from human and animal neuroscience studies could
therefore add to the WOE supporting the value of addressing parental stress in pediatric primary care
practice.

Do the policy implications of neuroscience go beyond merely adding confirmation to our existing
understanding of policy costs and benefits? At present, I believe the answer is no; however, given the
short history of SES neuroscience and its rapid growth, this may soon change. Although innovation is, by
nature, hard to predict, I have below tried to imagine some actionable neuroscience advances that
illustrate the variety of ways in which neuroscience might eventually inform policy.

[H2] Prospects for the future: actionable insights from neuroscience As Pavlakis and colleagues have
noted, a likely near-term application of neuroscience to policy is the use of measures of brain structure
and function as biomarkers72. Projecting modestly from current scientific knowledge, it can be imagined
that such measures could indicate risk for future cognitive and educational problems of the kind faced
by children of low SES. This approach capitalizes on the properties of neural measures discussed earlier:
these measures (which include relatively inexpensive and portable EEG-based measures) hold promise
as more sensitive predictors than behavioral data. Such biomarkers would be particularly valuable
where preverbal infants and young children are concerned. To the extent that interventions may be
most effective for young children, this advantage of predictive biomarkers is all the more
importantant72.

In addition to their use in clinical or educational practice, such biomarkers would facilitate research on
the efficacy of interventions. Analogous to the use of biomarkers as selection criteria or endpoint
measures in clinical trials targeting preclinical Alzheimer’s disease73, appropriately validated biomarkers
of SES disparities might serve as proxies and harbingers of later behavioral outcomes. Along these lines,
interventions designed to help disadvantaged individuals have been studied with the help of
biomarkers74,75. Proposed future intervention studies76 will incorporate EEG outcome measures and, in
one ambitious plan77 to study and enhance child development among the poor of Bangladesh, will also
incorporate functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) measures of brain activity.
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A related policy benefit of neural measures comes from their ability to reveal qualitative differences in
psychological processes as a function of SES. As noted above, studies have demonstrated different ways
of performing arithmetic in children of higher and lower SES39. An accumulation of such findings would
have implications for education policy. Specifically, in academic domains showing SES differences such
findings would indicate that we should not assume that teaching methods that have been validated with
one SES group will necessarily be effective for a different group.

Research in developmental neurobiology may also deliver actionable insights in the foreseeable future.
Consider prenatal brain development, which lays the groundwork for lifelong cognitive ability and
emotional wellbeing. Although reducing stress, toxin exposure and nutritional deficiencies are good
goals for any stage of life, the brevity of the prenatal period and our growing knowledge of the specific
windows of prenatal time when particular interventions could help makes policies promoting prenatal
neurodevelopment seem especially feasible and impactful78. For example, maternal SES has been shown
to be related to prenatal stress-immune system interactions, which were in turn related to infant brain
development in the first year of life79. Furthermore, early, but not late, pregnancy cortisol levels have
been demonstrated to affect amygdala volume and child behavior at age 780.

Concrete recommendations based on cellular mechanisms of brain development during childhood can
also be envisioned. For example, the possibility (described above) that low SES might lead to a
premature reduction of plasticity and consequent reduction of opportunities to learn47, if supported by
additional research, would recommend that we seek potentially modifiable causes of this
environmentally-driven precocity. These would plausibly include diet, endocrine disrupters and aspects
of the psychosocial environment48,81. A surprising array of other influences on the timing of brain
development, from neuromodulators governing the opening and closing of critical periods82 to the gut
microbiome83,84, offer additional potential avenues of intervention.

Finally, specific epigenetic changes associated with SES have been identified during prenatal and
postnatal life46,85,86,87. An animal model of early life stress and parenting has been developed88, which
specifies the pathways linking environmental stimuli to gene expression in the brain through a detailed
molecular pathway. When and if we understand SES-linked epigenetic changes and their consequences
for brain and behavior in comparable detail, we will be in possession of a wealth of potentially
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actionable knowledge. This includes intervention targets in the environment or in combination with
pharmacological therapies, as has been proposed for other indications89,90.

By considering examples of policy actions that could conceivably follow from neuroscience in the future,
we have entered the realm of science fiction. None of the possibilities sketched out above are feasible at
present and some may await decades of scientific progress before they can finally be judged as viable,
laughable, or something in between. However, this exercise in imagination serves a purpose: to
illustrate the variety of ways in which advances in the neuroscience of SES could, in principle, lead to
specific policy recommendations and the range of forms that such recommendations could take.

[H1] Morality and politics

Scientific theories can be controversial, and applications of science to real world human problems even
more so. In the case of neuroscience and policy related to SES, the disagreements are not just about
what’s true and what works; they are also about ways of viewing morally significant problems91. For this
reason, contemporary policy discussions invoking neuroscience, such as those lead by the World Bank11
or the Center on the Developing Child, are viewed as dangerous by some. To the extent that
neuroscience discourse emphasizes certain aspects of social problems and their solutions, it can exert a
powerful influence on public opinion and policy design.

The potential dangers of neuroscience discourse in this context have been discussed by sociologists and
historians of science working within a discipline known as ‘critical neuroscience’92. The term critical is
used in this field in a non-derogatory sense to mean reflective, analytic and interpretative. These
scholars have not, by and large, found fault with the science being cited in policy discussions. Rather,
they have noted that certain values, allocations of responsibility and policy goals seem implicit in the
framing of socioeconomic issues in terms of neuroscience. Below I summarize four of these critiques. In
each case I attempt to convey what I consider the valid concerns raised by the critiques as well as the
ways in which they may overstate the problems.

[H2] Responsibility and blame. It has been suggested that neuroscience presents us with a description of
a malfunctioning biological system rather than a morally wrong social arrangement. According to one
critic, instead of confronting “issues of equity, power, and justice [we instead focus on] the impact of the
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‘environment’ on brain function”93. Other critics have likened the neuroscience approach to “saying
slavery is ... morally wrong because it impacts brains” and suggested that the focus on brains has
implications for policy in that it eclipses social and economic policy targets, “effectively work[ing] to
conceal the social forces—both the actual poverty suffered by people and the systemic effects and
politics of inequality—from view”27.
I would agree that the neuroscience approach does draw more attention to the brain than to social
structures and justice, and that this could lead to the neglect of promising policy targets in society. For
example, the neuroscience-inspired policy literature has much to say about parenting practices in low
SES communities and parent training is a frequent policy recommendation94. However, it is important to
consider the context in which parents are caring for their children. Food insecurity, the threat of
homelessness and other stresses of poverty may well lead mothers to be preoccupied or depressively
withdrawn and, as a consequence, they may behave toward their children in less than beneficial ways.
Neuroscience-based arguments on the importance of early maternal responsiveness could divert
attention from interventions targeting nutrition, housing and other needs, in favor of parent training
programs. Such arguments could even be misunderstood as pointing the finger of blame at mothers of
low SES.
[H2] Essentializing low SES. Another concern is that neuroscience leads us to view low SES as a property
of person or brain, rather than a situation, “re-inscribing social and economic differences into
differences in brain architecture”95. Attributing the life failures of poor adults to epigenetic and other
environmental effects on their brains may seem kinder than blaming them for laziness or labeling them
hopeless because of their genes; however, as has been pointed out, it nevertheless categorizes them as
biologically inferior96. It has been suggested that there is a small step from this to stigmatizing or (given
the biomedical framing of neuroscience) pathologizing the poor27.
It is my belief that we should neither essentialize poverty, viewing it as a property of certain people’s
brains, nor stipulate that poverty can only be understood in terms of the extra-personal properties of
society. In trying to understand people in their contexts, ignoring the person is as unenlightening as
ignoring the context. Yes, it feels bad to talk about the causal contributions that suffering people make
to their own suffering, even if those contributions are understandable and inadvertent. But if we cut
short our analyses of the chains of influence at the point that those influences cross the boundary
between world and person, we are imposing a large blind spot on our view of a complex causal network.
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[H2] Values. A third criticism concerns the values embodied in neuroscience-based policy. One critic
notes that “the discourse of brain science affirms middle-class values/lifestyles by invoking cultural
practices and preferences specific to this group in the discourse’s explication of the ‘ideal’ environment
for ‘stimulating’ neurological development”25. One education leader points out that the ways in which
low SES students differ from other students are automatically labelled deficits and states “I am deeply
concerned today that work in what I will refer to as applied neuroscience is making deficit claims with
regard to language learning and executive control among populations of young people living in
poverty”97. She suggests that there is more than one kind of good development and that developmental
goals may vary across cultures and communities.

Others perceive, in neuroscience-based policy discussions, the neoliberal economic values of human
capital theory98. According this theory, economic development requires more than raw materials and
money; it also requires people who are productive members of society — the ‘human capital’ of healthy,
skilled and disciplined workers. Self-control and future-mindedness are traditional middle-class values
that are also important forms of human capital, and they figure prominently in research on executive
function development and SES99. Policies arising from this work may seem to place more value on raising
productive workers than on human wellbeing. One critic writes of the “entrepreneurial forms of selfgovernance” prioritized by neuroscience, and suggests that the goal is “babies emotionally primed to
navigate an economic system that prioritizes flexible, mobile, and adaptable workers”26. These concerns
shade into worries about social control, with another critic seeing “the discourse and practices of brain
science extend[ing] and legitimiz[ing] the extension of Foucauldian governmentality over lower income
populations, which are perceived as threatening social and state security”25.

I would agree that the case for increased government support for low-income families is often framed in
terms of economic development and social order. For example, the neuroscience-inspired Allen report
in the UK summarized the benefits of early childhood intervention as “improvements in behaviour,
reduction in violent crime, higher educational attainment, better employment opportunities and more
responsible parenting of the next generation”16. And these were the noneconomic benefits, presented
before the report’s economic case for investment in early childhood! Creating more productive and lawabiding individuals is certainly in the state’s interest; however, it does not follow that these efforts
deserve the negative connotations of social control. Furthermore, executive function can facilitate
achievement of one’s personal goals, as well as, or even in opposition to, the goals of the state. There is
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no necessary affinity between neuroscience and neoliberal ideals of humanity; neuroscience can in
principle illuminate any aspect of human psychology and behavior.

[H2] Fatalism. The brain’s critical or sensitive periods are frequently mentioned in the policy literature,
and have been used to emphasize the importance of supporting early childhood development. However,
the emphasis on prenatal and early postnatal development has led critics to warn of fatalism, which
could lead us to write off the needs of older children and adults. In the words of one author, “If young
brains subjected to deprived conditions, and to the inadequate parenting that often goes along with
them, are irrevocably damaged – pickled in stress hormones, stripped of synapses – there is no time to
waste, that is true. Yet such alarm, though it conveys urgency, can all too easily fuel defeatism... the
case for subsequent help is bound to seem weaker.”100.

In response, I would agree that a strong emphasis on critical or sensitive periods does indeed discourage
efforts to help older children, teens and adults, given fixed resources. Of course, neuroscience is not
alone in suggesting that earlier interventions will generally be more effective than later interventions;
for example, economists have reached the same policy conclusion101. We may well feel uncomfortable
with unequal distribution of help, such as the prioritizing of 1 year-olds over equally needy 10 year-olds
or 60 year-olds. However, even if we recognize a moral obligation to help all needy people, the expected
effectiveness of help at different ages is surely relevant to our decisions about resource distribution.
Finally, it must be clarified that contemporary neuroscience does not support sharply defined critical
periods for psychological development, and has only begun to understand age-related changes in
plasticity102. Indeed, one of the most important insights of recent decades in neuroscience is the degree
of plasticity that remains present in the adult brain103.

[H1] Conclusions

The neuroscience of SES is a young field (Fig. 1d). Many of the questions and controversies discussed in
this Perspective can be traced to its fledgling status. This is certainly true of the scientific criticism that
neuroscience knows too little about SES to be of use. It may even be true of the social, political and
moral criticisms reviewed above. My own experience working on the neuroscience of SES has taught me
that ideological criticisms are more likely to fasten onto schematic proposals and ‘in principle’ ideas than
onto real empirical work in progress. Nevertheless, the social criticisms reviewed here raise worthwhile
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considerations. The models and metaphors of science can implicitly influence policy choices in good or
bad ways and, for that matter, existing policy preferences may bias the inferences we make from the
science. These are reasons to de-silo and seek closer collaboration between neuroscientists and social
scientists engaged in critical neuroscience104.

Scientifically, we have only scratched the surface of the SES–brain function relationship, and many
questions remain open. Which findings will replicate and generalize, and which will not? What can we
say with confidence about the mechanisms linking SES and the brain? To what extent do the answers to
these questions depend on specific dimensions of SES, such as income or neighborhood characteristics,
or on poverty per se as opposed to gradations between higher levels of SES? Are individuals’ ages,
genders and genotypes part of the answer? Do the same mechanisms underlie SES disparities globally;
that is, do they apply in middle- and low-income countries as well as in the high-income countries in
which most of the research has been conducted? Do they vary across cultures or ethnicities, or between
urban and rural communities? There is little that we can now say with confidence. This is particularly
true when we remember that findings on adverse experience more generally (including trauma,
maltreatment and institutionalization) cannot be applied automatically to the understanding of
socioeconomic adversity. Thus, our knowledge of SES and the brain remains quite limited. If we fail to
appreciate the preliminary state of our knowledge, we risk the field’s credibility by promising too much
and disappointing policy-makers and funders. We also risk premature translation of research findings
into policy, which could harm the very people in need of help.

Will neuroscience research on SES advance to a state of practical usefulness given time? In one critic’s
view, “Neuroscience has little or nothing to contribute to addressing these problems [of low SES] and is
unlikely to add anything of significance in the future”24. I believe that one reason to doubt this
prediction is the multitude of ways that basic and clinical neuroscience have already found to shape
brain development and function, with no obvious barriers to their eventual application to the problems
of poverty. Another reason to reject pessimism at this point is the very short time that neuroscientists
have been studying SES. Depth of understanding and applicability take decades to emerge in any area of
neuroscience and, in the case of SES, the work is all quite recent and being pursued in relatively few
laboratories. Nevertheless, our current knowledge is sufficient to frame new scientific hypotheses to be
tested, boding well for the coming decade of basic research on SES and the brain.
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In sum, at this early stage of development, neuroscience for poverty policy is positioned between
enthusiasts and critics. In my view, enthusiasts often fail to recognize the scientific challenges ahead.
whereas critics either dismiss the whole enterprise as unrealistic, based on early results from a nascent
field, or see it as socially dangerous, based on the possibility that it could be used to justify harmful
policies. Thus surrounded, neuroscientists studying SES will need to manage expectations in the coming
years and, at the same time, assert the potential of this science for a positive impact on society.
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Box 1 Simplifying models, metaphors and messages
Harvard University’s Center on the Developing Child has been a leader in the integration of ideas and
insights from neuroscience with child policy (e.g 18) and has introduced a number of influential
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neuroscience-based concepts into public discourse on early childhood development. The director of the
Center and his collaborators noted that public resistance to support for some programs might stem in
part from preconceptions about human development and poverty more specifically105. To address this
issue, they partnered with the FrameWorks Institute, a communications research firm that “develops
simple and concrete metaphors that help people to organize information on issues in new ways, to fill in
understanding currently missing from the public’s repertoire, and to shift attention away from the
unproductive patterns they default to in understanding those issues.” To do so, the FrameWorks
Institute “identifies, empirically tests, and refines explanatory metaphors for complex social problems”.

Together the Center on the Developing Child and the Frameworks Institute developed a ‘core story’ of
early childhood development. The story features neuroscience prominently in the form of what they
term ‘simplifying models’ or ‘metaphors’: these include ‘brain architecture’ and ’toxic stress’105. This
framing highlights the psychological needs of young children, even preverbal infants who might seem to
need little more than food and shelter, by emphasizing the foundational role of early experience in
building brain architecture. It also counteracts common assumptions about personal responsibility and
the causes of poverty by emphasizing the “toxic stress” that accompanies adversities such as poverty
and the effects of such stress on parents and children.
The idea that socioeconomic disadvantage has physical consequences may impress upon laypeople and
policymakers the seriousness of poverty’s effects and the benefits of prevention or intervention. Indeed,
the effectiveness of this approach is illustrated by the comments of a focus group participant who, when
presented with the physiological consequences of severe stress that might accompany deep poverty
stated “...what really gets me from the study is that it could actually have a chemical or biological or
some sort of impact on the child’s brain... Behavior is one thing, and attitude and personality is one
thing, but if it can really negatively impact... the chemistry and the makeup of the brain––you can
damage that that early––that’s really serious”105.

Those sensitive to neuroscience over-reach might view the Center’s messages as implying a more
detailed scientific understanding of human brain development in real world contexts than we currently
have23. However, although the Center has made an unusual use of science for messaging, in my opinion it
is not a misuse. Indeed, a number of eminent neuroscientists have worked with the Center on the
Developing Child to ensure that the message, while simple and metaphorical, is not oversimplified or
misleading.
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Box 2 Correlation and causation
Socioeconomic status (SES) is correlated with intellectual achievement and mental health106,107,
but what pattern of causality underlies this correlation? Social scientists have long debated the
direction of causality between SES and various behavioral traits108 and their answers fall into two
broad categories.

According to the theory of social causation, SES causes differences in cognition and emotion
though environmental influences on the person108. In other words, SES causes its psychological
correlates. Given the importance of cognitive and emotional development for academic and
occupational success and emotional wellbeing, this would create a vicious cycle: a family’s
poverty would causally impact the capacities needed for socioeconomic success in the next
generation.

According to the theory of social selection, however, psychological differences that are under
genetic control cause SES differences through lowered educational and occupational
performance108. In other words, psychological differences cause SES differences. Genetic
transmission of psychological traits within the family cause children to develop the behavioral
phenotypes associated with their family’s SES, which would explain the intergenerational
stability of SES. Social scientists who hold a belief in social selection tend also to be skeptical
about the effectiveness of interventions109: indeed a recent critique of the neuroscience of
poverty questioned its practical utility, given the possibility that social selection is responsible
for the neural correlates of SES24. Whereas harmful environmental effects can in principle be
prevented by policies that eliminate the specific harms from the environment, it is less clear how
to correct detrimental effects of genetic origin (although critics do note that some genetic
diseases can be treated).

In the relationship between SES and the brain, it seems likely that selection and causation both
operate. It is hard to imagine how innately higher or lower abilities or greater or lesser emotional
resilience would not encourage upward or downward drift in SES over a lifetime. Indeed, this
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has been referred to as ‘Herrnstein’s syllogism’ for its seeming inevitability110. On the other
hand, there is evidence from social science that SES causes at least some of its psychological
correlates.

The strongest evidence for social causation comes from ‘natural experiments’, in which SES is
raised or lowered for reasons external to the subjects themselves111. For example, in the course of
a longitudinal psychiatric epidemiological study of children in primarily low-income rural
communities, a subset of the subjects began receiving unearned income supplements from the
opening of profitable casinos in their communities112. This provided the equivalent of an
experimental manipulation introduced part-way through the study. Fewer psychiatric symptoms
were found in subjects from families that had received the income supplement, and this was
particularly notable in those who were youngest when the supplements began. A recent followup showed the same pattern in adulthood, with lower rates of psychopathology among those who
received the supplements at younger ages113. In another study, adoption provided a quasiexperimental test of environmental causation in the realm of intelligence114. This study examined
the effect of adoption of one sibling to a higher or lower SES home on IQ in adolescence, with
the nonadopted sibling of each adoptee as a comparison subject. The findings showed that the
greater the SES increase of the adoptive family over the biological, the greater the IQ advantage
of adopted child over sibling.

Box 3 Establishing causality in the neuroscience of socioeconomic status

In the effort to distinguish ‘mere’ correlation from causation, neuroscience has an advantage that
is not shared by social science: the ability to experimentally manipulate the life conditions of
animal subjects. Of course, animals do not have socioeconomic status (SES). However, many of
the environmental factors that have been proposed to be proximal causes of SES disparities by
social scientists can be manipulated in animals and have been shown to exert a causal impact on
the brain32. For example, environmental stimulation has pervasive effects on brain structure and
function115. Stress causes numerous molecular, cellular and anatomical changes in the brains of
rodents and nonhuman primates9. Parenting behaviors are affected by environmental factors such
as stress116,117 and play a causal role in buffering the effects of stresses experienced by the
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offspring118. Although we do not yet know how detailed the parallels are between the neural
effects of stimulation, stress and parenting in animals and the correlates of SES in humans, there
is a broad-brushstroke similarity. If this similarity is not a reflection of some shared causal
mechanisms, then it is a remarkable coincidence.

Human neuroscience can also be brought to bear on the relationships between experience and the
brain, albeit without the power of experimental methods to test causality. Some have examined
the factors that statistically mediate the relationship of SES to brain function (e.g. 46). For
example, studies have shown that measures of stress or related measures of inflammation can
account for the effects of SES on brain structure or function45,119,120,121,122 (but see 123 for an
exception).

A few human neuroscience studies have assessed the effects of interventions to improve the
environment of poor children. Although these studies do not alter SES per se, they do manipulate
some of the proximal factors by which SES is proposed to affect brain structure and function.
Parenting interventions have been found to cause changes in attention and language processes
reflected in event related potentials74 and to be associated with less hippocampal volume loss at
long-term follow-up67. Comprehensive programs including early childhood cognitive enrichment
have resulted in changed neuroendocrine function75 and later brain structure124. Ultimately,
however, only a randomized controlled manipulation of SES can offer a definitive test of the
causal effect of SES on the brain. It has recently been announced that such a study is being
launched and will include an income intervention and neural as well as behavioral outcome
measures76.

Box 4 Neuroscience over-reach

Many individuals and organizations have embraced neuroscience as a source of poverty policy.
Others have been decidedly less enthusiastic. For example, in 1997 the education theorist John
Bruer attended a White House conference on the topic of ‘Early Childhood Development and
Learning: What New Research on the Brain Tells Us About Our Youngest Children’. According
to Bruer, the program displayed the sparseness of the connections between neuroscience and
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childhood disadvantage; only one neuroscientist presented at the conference, and she cited work
on visual development in cats. He reflected, “I heard numerous wide-ranging policy
recommendations based on the new brain science. Yet, I had heard relatively little brain research
... and none that provided a clear link between blind kittens and welfare reform”22.

A roughly contemporaneous project was the landmark book, ‘From Neurons to
Neighborhoods’125, whose title also seemed to promise a neuroscience–policy integration. Based
on a National Academy of Sciences collaboration among scientists, child development and
policy experts, the book contained an excellent chapter on brain development, alongside many
other authoritative chapters on the psychology of children, families and communities. However,
reflecting the state of the science of the time, there was little cross-referencing between the brain
chapter and the others.

It is tempting to view these early attempts at neuroscience–social policy integration as indicative
of neuroscience ‘over-reach’. Indeed, a number of prominent voices have argued that
neuroscience is being oversold as an approach to diverse societal problems23,126,127,128. In
addition, the ‘seductive allure of neuroscience’, a term coined by Weisberg and colleagues129,
describes the tendency of laypersons to be persuaded by neuroscience, even when it is
nonsensical. Although these critics describe many valid examples of neuroscience over-reach, I
believe that it would be a mistake to paint all attempts to develop nonmedical applications of
neuroscience with the same broad brush. And, although the seductive allure of neuroscience is a
real phenomenon, so is the ‘seductive allure of seductive allure’130, which has created its own
legacy of uncritical denigration of neuroscience, especially neuroimaging.

Furthermore, although there is no guarantee that progress in neuroscience will help us understand
socioeconomic status (SES) and its life-course correlates, it seems highly likely that it will. Why
would a fuller understanding of any problem, couched at any applicable level of explanation –
physical, biological, psychological, economic, social or political – not be an asset when trying to
solve the problem? In this very minimal way, at least, the neuroscience of SES is relevant to the
design of poverty policy. Poverty has measurable neural correlates, for which neuroscience
offers potential causal accounts, and this establishes the potential for policy relevance. As
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modest a claim as this is, I believe that it bears stating explicitly as counterpoint to recent
criticisms of neuroscience over-reach.

Figure 1 Trends in health and cognitive outcomes across levels of SES, and in SES neuroscience
publications across time. a-c| Socioeconomic status is related to many important life outcomes,
including physical health and longevity, mental health and wellbeing, and cognitive ability.
Three illustrative findings are shown here. a| Estimated remaining life expectancy in 2005, for 25
year old Americans with different levels of educational attainment. b| Relationship between
household income and the percentage of individuals that report symptoms similar to those of a
mood disorder in Canada in 2014. c| Relationship between family income and average scores on
the US Scholastic Aptitude Test in 2013. d| The neuroscience of SES has recently become an
active area of research. This is reflected in the number of publications on this topic since the
beginning of the century. The chart shows publications between 2000 and 2017, identified by
searching titles and abstracts in PubMed for the five terms ‘socioeconomic’, ‘socioeconomic
status’, ‘SES’, ‘income’ and ‘poverty’, combined with eighteen neuroscience terms including
‘MRI’, ‘DTI’, ‘EEG’, ‘grey matter’, ‘cortical’, ‘prefrontal’ and ‘default mode’, and eliminating
articles with the terms ‘schizophrenia’, ‘breast’, ‘injury’ and ‘disease’. Part a, adapted from
Rostron, Boies & Arias131. Panel b adapted from Canadian Community Health Survey, 2014.
Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada. Panel c adapted from College Board, 2013.
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